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Abstract
In the paper the views and tendencies in the philosophical re#ection on mathematics in Poland
between the wars are analyzed. Views of most outstanding representatives of Lvov–Warsaw
Philosophical School and of Polish Mathematical School are presented. Their in#uence on logical
and mathematical researches is considered.
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The aim of this paper is to indicate main trends and tendencies, main standpoints
and views in the philosophical re#ection on mathematics in Poland between the wars,
i.e., between 1918 and 1939.
Why just this period? Because it was the time of intensive development of mathemat-
ics (Polish Mathematical School) and of logic (Warsaw Logical School, Lvov–Warsaw
Philosophical School) in Poland. Hence a natural question arises whether this develop-
ment of mathematics and logic was accompanied by philosophical re#ection on those
disciplines, whether the researches were founded on and stimulated by certain <xed
philosophical presuppositions. On the other hand, philosophy of mathematics and logic
is based on and uses certain results of metamathematics, of the foundations of mathe-
matics and of logic. Did logical achievements in#uence the philosophical re#ection?
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1. Before 1918
To discuss the philosophy of mathematics between the wars one should start earlier
and consider predecessors.
In the 19th century there was no signi<cant work on logic or on philosophy of
mathematics in Poland. One can mention only JEozef Maria Hoene-WroEnski (1776–
1853) but his ideas did not <nd any resonance. The reason was the ambiguity of his
ideas and the unclear language in which they were formulated.
The situation began to change at the end of the 19th century. The main centers which
played important role here were Lvov and Cracow. In Lvov the main <gure was of
course Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), the founder of the Lvov–Warsaw Philo-
sophical School. His role in the development of the analytic tradition of philosophy
and of logic in Poland is well known. The atmosphere in Lvov stimulated also mathe-
maticians. Here in 1908 Wac law SierpiEnski (1882–1969) obtained his habilitation and
started his lectures, in particular lectures in set theory which were probably the <rst
lectures in set theory in the world. What is important from our point of view is the
fact that SierpiEnski has chosen as the subject of his habilitation lecture a problem from
the philosophy of mathematics. His lecture was devoted to the problem of the role and
meaning of the concept of a correspondence in mathematics (cf. SierpiEnski [13]). He
described it as one of the most important notions of mathematics, as “a source of all
best ideas”. The reason of that he saw in the fact that, as H. PoincarEe wrote in La Sci-
ence et l’Hypothese: “Mathematicians do not study objects but relations between them;
hence it is not important for them when some objects are replaced by another provided
the relations between them remain unchanged”. (One can see here structuralistic ideas.)
He also added that the source and base of all applications of mathematics was the ex-
istence of an ideal correspondence between the domain of abstract mathematical ideas
and the domain of the reality.
Also another mathematician who played a crucial role in the rise of Polish Mathemat-
ical School, i.e., Zygmunt Janiszewski (1888–1920) showed interest in the philosophy
of mathematics. He received his habilitation in Lvov in 1913. His habilitation thesis
was in topology but the title of his habilitation lecture was “On realism and idealism
in mathematics” (cf. Janiszewski [4]), hence it was devoted to the philosophy of math-
ematics. Janiszewski considered there the discussion between realists and idealists on
the problem of existence in mathematics. This problem appeared with great power in
connection with set theory and especially with Zermelo’s well-ordering theorem (1904).
Janiszewski presented in his lecture several opinions in this dispute and showed in the
conclusion a scepticism towards perspective of <nding a <nal solution to this problem
because it is a part of the old dispute between nominalism and platonism.
Why did SierpiEnski and Janiszewski choose subjects from the philosophy of math-
ematics for their habilitation lectures? One of the reasons could be the fact that the
habilitation procedures were at the Philosophical Faculty and most of the members of
the Faculty Councel were non-mathematicians. Therefore SierpiEnski and Janiszewski
have chosen general subjects. But on the other hand they could choose also popular
subjects from mathematics itself. The fact that they have chosen subjects just from
the philosophy of mathematics can indicate that there was a good atmosphere in Lvov
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for foundations and philosophy of mathematics and that they both were interested not
only in mathematics but also in its philosophy. Both were convinced that one needed
a conception of mathematics on which the development of this discipline in Poland
could be founded and suggested that set theory could be a basis of it.
The interests of Polish mathematicians in logic and philosophy of mathematics as
well as their conviction of the importance of those domains for mathematics can be
seen also in the interesting book published in 1915 Poradnik dla samouk"ow (Handbook
(Guide) for Autodidacts) devoted to mathematics. One <nds there chapters by Jan
 Lukasiewicz (introductory chapter “About science”), W. SierpiEnski (about set theory)
and some chapters by Z. Janiszewski who was the main contributor and the soul of
the whole enterprise. Janiszewski wrote chapters on the foundations of geometry, on
mathematical logic and on philosophical problems of mathematics (cf. [3]). The last
one was an extensive chapter presenting main problems and views of the philosophy
of mathematics with an extensive bibliography in which the current positions of the
literature were well represented. In Vol. III of the guide (published in 1923) there was
also a chapter “On the meaning of logic for mathematics” [15] by Jan SleszyEnski. It is
worth mentioning here that SleszyEnski wrote there that mathematical logic cannot be
reduced to the methodology of mathematics, because it is an autonomous discipline.
He defended also logic against various objections formulated by mathematicians and
philosophers (among others by PoincarEe).
The above remarks indicate that connections between mathematicians and logicians
in Warsaw were in fact very good and that they collaborated closely. We return to that
later.
The second center which should be considered here was Cracow. Main <gures there
were Stanis law Zaremba (1863–1942) and Jan SleszyEnski (1854–1931) (whom we
mentioned already). Zaremba was working mainly in analysis and applications of math-
ematics but was interested also in the philosophy and methodology of mathematics. He
published several papers in the last domains, in particular “PoglPad na te kierunki w
badaniach matematycznych, ktEore majPa znaczenie teoretyczno-poznawcze” (Remarks on
those trends in mathematical investigations which have epistemological meaning) [28]
and “Uwagi o metodzie w matematyce i <zyce” (Remarks on the methods of math-
ematics and physics) [31]. In the <rst one he considered the meaning of the studies
in the foundations of geometry and in set theory for the philosophy, especially for the
epistemology. In the second one he claimed that the investigations of the nature are
the most important source of new mathematical discoveries and that the role of math-
ematics in physics consists in providing a tool to deduce corollaries from hypotheses
obtained by observation and experience.
Talking about Zaremba one should also mention the controversy about the concept
of a magnitude. In 1916 Jan  Lukasiewicz (1878–1956) devoted one of his courses at
Warsaw University to the methodology of deductive sciences. During his lectures he
discussed the book by Zaremba [29] Arytmetyka teoretyczna (Theoretical Arithmetic)
and analyzed it from the methodological point of view challenging some principles
adopted by Zaremba as well as his de<nition of a magnitude (in particular he criticized
the usage of sentences with no contents).  Lukasiewicz [7] published his remarks in
a paper. This was the beginning of a dispute in which several persons took part,
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among others Kazimierz Kuratowski, Tadeusz Czez˙owski, Leon Chwistek and of course
Zaremba. The essence of the dispute concerned in fact not the concept of a magnitude
but the role of logic in mathematics. Zaremba [30] represented the view that logic
should be “in mathematics”, should be ancilla mathematicae (cf. the title of his work
La logique en math"ematique) whetheras  Lukasiewicz saw the (mathematical) logic as
an autonomous discipline providing the foundations and methodology of mathematics.
The latter idea was also accepted by leaders and founders of Polish Mathematical
School in Warsaw who stressed the role of set theory, of the foundations of mathematics
and of mathematical logic and saw the logic in the center of mathematics (by Zaremba
its place was in the periphery of mathematics).
Zaremba and SleszyEnski in#uenced the interest in logic and the philosophy of math-
ematics of some young mathematicians in Cracow, among others of Witold Wilkosz
(1891–1941). He wrote some papers in which he discussed the meaning of mathe-
matical logic to mathematics and the process of abstraction (trying to base it on the
abstraction principle) (cf. Wilkosz [26,27]).
With Cracow was connected also Edward Stamm (1886–1940) who studied in
Switzerland and Austria. He was a teacher of mathematics in a small town and the
author of some papers devoted to the algebra of logic and to the philosophy of math-
ematics (cf. [16–18]). Especially interesting is the paper “Czem jest i czem bPedzie
matematyka?” (What is and what will be mathematics?) [17] in which analyzing the
development of mathematics he comes to the conclusion that “mathematics is not a
science but a method, it is the ideal deductive-symbolic stage of a science in general”.
2. The period 1918–1939
We should start by stressing the fact of close collaboration and mutual in#uences
of logicians and mathematicians in Warsaw in the considered period. Both groups
saw the mathematical logic and the methodology of mathematics as disciplines which
are autonomous with respect to both mathematics and philosophy on the one hand
and on the other they were convinced that those disciplines play a fundamental role in
developing mathematics. According to them mathematics and mathematical logic should
be neutral towards various philosophical controversies, they should be developed
independent of any philosophical presuppositions. This attitude can be illustrated, for
example, by the conviction of Polish mathematicians that the philosophy of the
axiom of choice must be separated from its role in mathematics. SierpiEnski wrote in
[14, p. 95]:
Still, apart from our personal inclination to accept the axiom of choice, we must
take into consideration, in any case, its role in the set theory and in the calcu-
lus. On the other hand, since the axiom of choice has been questioned by some
mathematicians, it is important to know which theorems are proved with its aid
and to realize the exact point at which the proof has been based on the axiom of
choice; for it has frequently happened that various authors have made use of the
axiom of choice in their proofs without being aware of it. And after all, even no
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one questioned the axiom of choice, it would not be without interest to investigate
which proofs are based on it and which theorems are proved without its aid—this,
as we know, is also done with regard to other axioms.
This means simply that one should disregard philosophical controversies (and treat
them as a “private” matter) and investigate (controversial) axioms as purely mathe-
matical constructions using any fruitful methods.
One of the consequences of the described attitude of Polish logicians and mathemati-
cians was the fact that they did not attempt to develop a comprehensive philosophy
of mathematics and logic (Stanis law LeEsniewski and Leon Chwistek were here the
exceptions!). They formulated their philosophical opinions concerning mathematics or
logic only occassionally and only on problems which were just interesting for them or
on which they actually worked. Consequently, there were no genuine philosophers of
mathematics in Poland. Philosophical remarks were formulated by logicians and math-
ematicians only on the margin of their proper mathematical or logical works (and had
no meaning for the results themselves).
The current trends and views in the philosophy of mathematics, i.e., logicism, intu-
itionism and formalism, were of course well known (and there appeared papers dis-
cussing those tendencies, their meaning and development). But none of them was
represented in Warsaw School. Moreover, it did not represent any other trend, it had
no oUcial philosophy of logic and mathematics. This followed from the belief of the
autonomy of logic and mathematics with respect to philosophy. Opinions in the <eld
of the philosophy of logic and mathematics were treated as “private” problems and
philosophical declarations were made relunctantly and seldom. If they were made then
it was stressed, directly or indirectly, that these were personal opinions.
Though some of logical investigations were motivated by philosophical problems
(e.g. the many-valued logics by  Lukasiewicz) but the formal, logical constructions
were always separated from their philosophical interpretations. This attitude was still
strengthened by Alfred Tarski (1901–1983) and Andrzej Mostowski (1913–1975) who
claimed that a logician or a mathematician can have philosophical views or sympathies
quite diVerent from those which could be suggested by the scope of problems he is
working on. They also provided good examples of this attitude by their own work.
Mostowski wrote about Tarski (cf. Mostowski [11, p. 81]):
Tarski, in oral discussions, has often indicated his sympathies with nominalism.
While he never accepted the ‘reism’ of Tadeusz KotarbiEnski, he was certainly
attracted to it in the early phase of his work. However, the set-theoretical methods
that form the basis of his logical and mathematical studies compel him constantly
to use the abstract and general notions that a nominalist seeks to avoid. In the
absence of more extensive publications by Tarski on philosophical subjects, this
con#ict appears to have remained unresolved.
Mostowski on the other hand was a sympathizer of constructivism but in his logical
and foundational investigations did not take into account the methodological limitations
put by it.
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Another example are the investigations on intuitionistic logic carried out among
others by Tarski without accepting intuitionism as the philosophy of mathematics. Pro-
gramme of Janiszewski and Polish Mathematical School created set-theoretical founda-
tions of mathematics in the methodological and not philosophical sense.
What were the separated philosophical opinions formulated by Polish logicians,
philosophers and mathematicians? Let us start by the problem of psychologism. Psy-
chologism was popular in the philosophy of logic and mathematics in the late 19th
century. According to it, the objects studied by logic and mathematics exist as psy-
chic entities and come to be known just like other psychic facts. Already Twardowski
took a step towards antipsychologism. Next step was a paper by  Lukasiewicz “Logika
a psychologia” (Logic and psychology) [5] where he declared himself <rmly for an-
tipsychologism in logic. His arguments were as follows: (1) logical laws are certain
and psychological ones (being empirical in fact) only probable, (2) laws of logic and
laws of psychology diVer in content because the former concern the connections be-
tween the truth and falsehood of judgements and the latter state relationships between
psychic phenomena, (3) the terms ‘thinking’ and ‘judgement’ have diVerent meaning
in psychology and in logic.  Lukasiewicz stated <nally in [5]:
The clari<cation of the relationship between logic and psychology may prove to
the advantage of both disciplines. Logic will be puri<ed of the weeds of psychol-
ogism and empiricism, which hamper its true development, and the psychology of
cognition will rid itself of elements of apriorism, behind which the genuine light
of its truth could not fully show itself. It must be borne in mind that logic is an
a priori science, like mathematics, while psychology, like any natural science, is,
and must be, based on experience.
 Lukasiewicz’s arguments against psychologism were similar to those of Husserl and
Meinong. They were universally accepted in Poland. Their consequence was the con-
viction that the certainty of theorems of logic cannot be explained by psychological
arguments. This was in fact a negative solution to the problem of certainty of logic.
Since almost all Polish logicians were sympathizers of genetic empiricism hence any
aprioristic solution of this problem could not be accepted.
Polish logicians did not accept the concept of logic as pure syntax. This view
was popular at that time, it was developed under the in#uence of Hilbert’s meta-
mathematics and the philosophy of language of Vienna Circle. An exception was
here Chwistek who treated his semantical systems as formal systems of expressions.
Warsaw School represented the semantical point of view. In this context one should
see the semantical foundations of logic founded by Tarski in the 1930s. An origi-
nal approach to the problem of the nature of logic was represented by LeEsniewski.
One can call it intuitive formalism. He attempted the complete formalization of log-
ical systems but claimed that formal expressions always code a <xed intuitive
contents.
The semantical point of view implied the rejection of analytical concept of logic, i.e.,
the rejection of the thesis that logic is a collection of tautologies that are contentually
empty (this is a thesis on logic and mathematics versus reality). LeEsniewski (and
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KotarbiEnski) claimed that logic describes the most general features of being, logic
plays a role of a general theory of the real world.
Tarski described the concept of tautology as vague and did not see any objective
basis for the division of terms into logical and extra-logical. Consequently he did not
treat the borderline between formal and empirical disciplines as sharply marked.
Andrzej Mostowski wrote in [12, p. 42] that various metamathematical results:
obtained by the mathematical method con<rm, therefore, the assertion of materi-
alistic philosophy that mathematics is in the last resort a natural science, that its
notions and methods are rooted in experience and that attempts at establishing the
foundations of mathematics without taking into account its originating in natural
sciences are bound to fail.
And added:
An explanation of the nature of mathematics does not belong to mathematics but
to philosophy, and is possible only within the limits of a broadly conceived philo-
sophical view treating mathematics not as detached from other sciences but taking
into account its being rooted in natural sciences, its applications, its associations
with other sciences and, <nally, its history.
 Lukasiewicz’s views concerning the considered problem of relations between logic
and mathematics on the one hand and reality on the other were changing. In [6]
he claimed that logical and mathematical judgements are a priori truths about the
world of ideal entities. Hence he treated both disciplines as unrelated to experience.
The discovery of many-valued logics implied that  Lukasiewicz maintained that logic
systems can be given an ontological interpretation and that experience will help to
decide which of systems of logic is ful<lled in the reality (cf. [8]). Later he tended to
the conventionalism and relativism. In [10] he wrote:
We have no means to decide which of the n-valued systems of logic [: : :] is true.
Logic is not a science of the laws of thought or of any real object; it is, in my
opinion, only an instrument which enables us to draw asserted conclusions from
asserted premises. [: : :] The more useful and richer a logical system is, the more
valuable it is.
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963) was also a sympathizer of conventionalism (in
a radical version). He claimed that logic is something implied by the meaning rules
(rules of sense), both axiomatic and deductive ones. Later he abandoned the radical
conventionalism and claimed that laws of logic refer indirectly to the experience and
that they should be treated as rules of inference, hence they belong to the metascience
and are mainly of a methodological character.
Next problem which was discussed and commented was the problem of nominalism.
A declared nominalist was LeEsniewski. Hence he denied the existence of any general
objects. Consequently, the systems he created consisted of a <nite number of individual
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inscriptions. Tarski had nominalistic leanings (inherited from LeEsniewski) but the
needs of metamathematics made him to abandon these sympathies. In particular he
referred to formula types, that is classes of equiform formulas but these classes of
formulas were treated by him as consisting of formulas interpreted as physical
bodies.
 Lukasiewicz’s view towards nominalism was diVerent. He maintained that arguments
of Tarski defending nominalism were not suUcient. He thought that logicians merely
use nominalistic terminology but in fact they are not nominalists. He inclined to inter-
pret logic in an outright neo-platonic spirit. In [9] he wrote:
In concluding these remarks I should like to outline an image which is connected
with the most profound intuitions which I always experience in the face of logistic.
That image will perhaps shed more light on the true background of that discipline,
at least in my case, than all discursive description could. Now, whenever I work
on even the least signi<cant logistic problem—for instance, when I search for
the shortest axiom of the implicational propositional calculus—I always have the
impression that I am facing a powerful, most coherent and most resistant struc-
ture. I sense that structure as if it were a concrete, tangible object, made of the
hardest metal, a hundred times stronger than steel and concrete. I cannot change
anything in it; I do not create anything of my own will, but by strenuous work I
discover in it ever new details and arrive at unshakable and eternal truths. Where
is and what is that ideal structure? A believer would say that it is in God and His
thought.
Note that  Lukasiewicz stressed that logic itself cannot solve the philosophical contro-
versy over universals. Hence any claims that logic is nominalistic or not are groundless.
Similar opinions towards the neutrality of logic with respect to the problem of univer-
sals held Ajdukiewicz and Czez˙owski. Add that KotarbiEnski in the early and radical
version of his reism held views similar to those of LeEsniewski.
As remarked above Leon Chwistek (1884–1944) and Stanis law LeEsniewski (1886–
1939) were two exceptions in the described attitude towards philosophical problems
and issues, more exactly they were interested only in those logical problems which
were implied by their own philosophical views in the foundations of mathematics,
their philosophical views generated their interest in particular problems, their logical
investigations were motivated by their philosophical views.
LeEsniewski had the chair of the philosophy of mathematics at the University of
Warsaw (since 1919 till his death in 1939). He represented a philosophical approach
to logic though he was convinced that philosophical investigations are hopeless and lead
to no de<nite solutions. His aim was to construct a system of logic that would satisfy
two general requirements: it should serve as the foundations for mathematics and should
be constructed in a manner free of any ambiguities. He did it by constructing three
systems: protothetic, ontology and mereology. LeEsniewski meant logical systems in a
nominalistic way. Language was for him a collection of concrete individual inscriptions.
There existed only those expressions which have been actually written, he admitted
no ‘potential’ existence. This was called by him ‘constructive nominalism’. It was
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connected with intuitive formalism. Consequently he rejected the interpretation of logic
and mathematics as games using symbols devoid of meaning. According to him every
language system says ‘something’ ‘about something’, is a way to express what is
intuitively true, is an indispensable way of encoding and transmitting logical intuitions.
Add also that LeEsniewski maintained that logic should be meant as extensional and
bivalence.
Chwistek is known mainly for his logical works, i.e., for his simpli<cation of the
theory of types of Russell and Whitehead (he did it in a nominalistic spirit). His aim in
logical investigations was to create a comprehensive system of logic and mathematics
based on a theory of expressions (called by him rational metamathematics). His results
and ideas had rather limited in#uence. The reason was the complicated and nonstandard
notation used by him as well as his way of presenting the results.
He represented rationalism (called by him critical rationalism) and rejected irrational-
ism. According to him there are two sources of knowledge: experience and deduction.
Methods used in science and in the philosophy should be constructive. The aim of
science is to describe by mathematical expressions objects given in an experience.
Mathematical formulas are only descriptions of an experience and cannot be treated as
laws concerning objects which are not given by experience.
One of the most known philosophical conceptions of Chwistek was his theory of the
plurality of the reality. It was published for the <rst time in his paper from [1] “Trzy
odczyty odnoszPace siPe do pojPecia istnienia” (Three lectures concerning the concept
of existence) and found its <nal presentation in his book Granice nauki (Limits of
Science) [2]. He postulated, according to various types of experience, four types of
reality: reality of impressions, reality of images, reality of things, and physical reality
(constructed in science). He attempted also to characterize properties of those types of
realities by suitable sets of axioms.
Chwistek represented in logic and mathematics nominalism and was against for-
malism. He claimed that objects of deductive systems are expressions and one cannot
accept any other objects. According to him geometry is an experimental discipline. The
development of non-euclidean geometries was considered by him as the most important
achievement in science. It rejected the Kantian idealism and the view that geometry
is given a priori. Geometry and other mathematical theories as well as theories of the
science should be developed constructively, i.e., one should base them on such axioms
and de<nitions that the theorems deduced from them should be in accordance with
experience. This would suggest that he would accept conventionalism. But in Granice
nauki he rejected it. Moreover he claimed that conventionalism was incorrect not only
in science but it was also a source of wrong views in social problems (it reduced truth
to the usefulness and eUciency and in this way led to the reinforcement of the ruling
class).
3. Alfred Tarski
In previous sections we mentioned some views of Tarski concerning the philosophy
of logic and mathematics. Let us say now more about his philosophy (cf. [23–25]).
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Start by noting that Tarski was interested in philosophical problems and very actively
participated in the philosophical life of his time. He was convinced of philosophical
signi<cance of his works, in particular of his work on truth. In [20] he wrote:
I shall be satis<ed if this paper convince the reader that the method used above
already now is an indispensable apparatus which may be helpful in considera-
tions of purely philosophical problems. [: : :] The central problem of this paper—
construction of a de<nition of a true sentence and founding a scienti<c basis of
a theory of truth—belongs to epistemology and is one of the main problems in
this domain of philosophy. Hence I expect that just specialists in epistemology
will take an interest in it, that—not becoming discouraged by diUcult notions
and methods, which so far have not been applied in this <eld—will analyze in a
critical way results contained in it and will be able to use them in their further
studies.
He described himself as (cf. Tarski [21]):
Being a mathematician (as well as a logician, perhaps a philosopher of a sort)
[: : :]
Tarski’s philosophical attitude was anti-metaphysical, he supported the idea of sci-
enti<c philosophy. He accepted a programme of “small philosophy” which aims at
detailed and systematic analysis of the concepts used in philosophy. Such a philosophy
is minimalistic, anti-speculative and sceptical towards many fundamental problems of
traditional philosophy. This attitude was inherited by Tarski from the Lvov–Warsaw
School and strengthened by contacts with the Vienna Circle. He also maintained em-
piricism and abondoned the analytic/synthetic distinction and stressed that logical and
empirical truths belong to the same generic category. In#uenced by LeEsniewski and
KotarbiEnski he was inclined to rather a strongly nominalistic understanding of expres-
sions. According to this sentences are treated as concrete physical objects and languages
as consisting of token-expressions. Needs of metalogical studies forced the understand-
ing of them as expressions-types. Tarski sharply contrasted colloquial, natural language
and formalized language.
Tarski was inclined to identify mathematics with the deductive method. He main-
tained that there is no hard borderline between formal and empirical sciences. He
admitted the rejection of logical and mathematical theories on empirical grounds. He
claimed also that there is no sharp demarcation between logical and factual truth and
that the concept of tautology is unclear.
One must stress that all those were his “private” philosophical views which did not
in#uence his logical and mathematical researches, in other words, his researches were
independent of any philosophical presuppositions. In the paper “Fundamentale BegriVe
der Methodologie der deduktiven Wissenschaften” [19] he expicitly wrote:
[: : :] it should be noted that no particular philosophical standpoint regarding the
foundations of mathematics is presupposed in the present work.
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This was typical for him and for the whole Warsaw School in logic. This indepen-
dence of logical and mathematical studies and philosophical views explains the cogni-
tive con#ict and discrepancy between Tarski’s nominalistic and empiricistic sympathies
and his “platonic” mathematical and logical practice. Note that his attitude enabled him
to contribute to various important foundational streams without the necessity of accept-
ing their philosophical assumptions and attempting to reconcile the philosophy and the
research practice. His programme of metamathematics can be summarized by his words
from the paper [22] where he wrote:
As an essential contribution of the Polish school to the development of meta-
mathematics one can regard the fact that from the very beginning it admitted into
metamathematical research all fruitfull methods, whether <nitary or not.
Note that this attitude was in full accordance with the attitude of Polish mathemati-
cians indicated above. According to it one should study the problems using any fruitfull
methods and making no philosophical presuppositions. There is no need to announce
one’s philosophical views concerning the investigated problems because this does not
belong to scienti<c duties, this is a “private” aVair.
4. Conclusions
As we showed above Polish logicians and mathematicians believed that philosophical
problems of logic and mathematics are important. They knew quite well the current
views and trends in this <eld, commented upon them and formulated several own opin-
ions concerning the philosophy of mathematics. But on the other hand they treated logic
and mathematics as autonomous disciplines independent of the philosophical re#ection
on them, independent of any philosophical presuppositions. They sharply separated
mathematical and logical research practice and philosophical discussions concerning
logic and mathematics. Philosophical views and opinions were treated as “private”
matter that should not in#uence the mathematical and metamathematical investigations
where all correct methods can and should be used.
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